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The detection and management of diseases become quite complicated when pathogens contain
asymptomatic phenotypes amongst their ranks, as evident during the recent COVID-19 pandemic.
Spreading of diseases has been studied extensively under the paradigm of Susceptible - Infected -
Recovered - Deceased (SIRD) dynamics. Various game-theoretic approaches have also addressed
disease spread, many of which consider S, I, R, and D as strategies rather than as states. Re-
markably, most studies from the above approaches do not account for the distinction between the
symptomatic or asymptomatic aspect of the disease. It is well-known that precautionary measures
like washing hands, wearing masks and social distancing significantly mitigate the spread of many
contagious diseases. Herein, we consider the adoption of such precautions as strategies and treat
S, I, R, and D as states. We also attempt to capture the differences in epidemic spreading aris-
ing from symptomatic and asymptomatic diseases. Through extensive computer simulations, we
examine how the cost of maintaining precautionary measures as well as the extent of mass testing
in a population affects the final fraction of proactive individuals. We observe that the lack of mass
testing could potentially lead to a pandemic in case of asymptomatic diseases.
I. INTRODUCTION
Occasionally, an infectious disease can spread to such
an extent, that it significantly affects a vast number of
people and indeed the majority of the population. Such a
scenario is referred to as an epidemic [1]. It becomes pan-
demic in nature when it affects multiple countries, per-
haps at the global level. The impact of an epidemic can
reach the height of devastation, especially if the pathogen
also leads to asymptomatic carriers [2, 3]. Obviously,
such asymptomatic infections present a stark variance to
symptomatic infections — wherein the symptoms of in-
fections are clearly manifest. Henceforth, we will refer to
the former as class A infections and the latter as classM
infections. An infection with asymptomatic phenotypes
presents remarkable consequences. It severely hinders
the containment of infection and the management of the
infected. These unfortunate effects have been in full dis-
play during the recent Covid-19 pandemic [4] as well as
the “Spanish influenza” [5]. Revolutionary advances in
medicine have been achieved between these two catastro-
phes separated by a century. And yet, little can evidently
be done to contain the spread of such pandemics — when
in full rage.
Epidemic spreading has been modelled extensively
through SIRD dynamics on networks [6]. It has also
been studied independently through game-theoretic ap-
proaches, many of which involve networks [7]. Herein,
we adopt a game-theoretic approach towards epidemic
spreading on heterogeneous networks [6–11]. One of our
prime objectives is to clearly demonstrate the effects aris-
ing from differences in asymptomatic and symptomatic
phenotypes on epidemic modeling. This extremely im-
portant biological aspect has not been accorded suffi-
cient attention in studies on epidemic spreading involv-
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ing SIRD dynamics or game-theoretic approaches on net-
works.
Generally, to prevent the spread of any transmissible
disease, mass administration of vaccines – if available – is
the most desirable option. Significant research has been
conducted to scrutinize the vaccination process and its
effect on the spread of an epidemic [9, 12]. However, in
the absence of vaccines, asymptomatically infected indi-
viduals (especially in class A diseases), are likely to be
unaware of their own condition. They can unwittingly
act as spreaders or even as super-spreaders if they do not
resort to proper precautionary measures [13]. As well-
known, precautionary measures in the form of frequently
washing one’s hands, wearing masks, and social distanc-
ing are some optimal strategies to limit the spread of
many contagious diseases. In more extreme cases, lock-
down may be required, which obviously presents signifi-
cant economic and social costs.
Susceptible-Infected-Recovered-Deceased or SIRD dy-
namics specifies that every member of the population
would be in one of the following four states, at any given
instant of time, t. These states are susceptible, S(t),
infected, I(t), recovered, R(t), and deceased, D(t) and
would also be frequently referred to hereinafter as S, I,
R, and D respectively [14]. Irrespective of their state,
susceptible individuals and infected yet undetected in-
dividuals can choose from either of the following two
strategies when facing an epidemic. These individuals
can either adopt precautionary measures and act respon-
sibly or they can remain careless and spread the disease.
Any proactive person would obviously need to pay a cer-
tain “cost” in order to sustain these measures and act
responsibly. In addition, mass testing would surely go a
long way in identifying infected individuals. Mass test-
ing ratio, τ , denotes the fraction of the entire population,
which has been tested for a given disease. Its importance
in class A diseases especially can hardly be overempha-
sised. A prime motivation of this work is to examine
the manner in which precautionary measures and mass
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2testing can affect the spread of an epidemic.
In any infection, the infected individuals definitely pos-
sess the capacity to be quite contagious during the in-
cubation period. This is true for both class A and
class M diseases. Generally, most diseases are neither
purely symptomatic nor purely asymptomatic. How-
ever, many diseases are predominantly symptomatic or
predominantly asymptomatic. In an epidemic session,
some infected individuals may show symptoms and oth-
ers may not. The manifestation of symptoms may de-
pend on the nature and severity of the disease, the immu-
nity of the infected individuals, and sundry other factors.
Herein, we distinguish between classM and class A dis-
eases by using the parameter, σ, which is the Symptom
Manifestation Ratio. Of all infected individuals, σ is
the fraction of infected individuals – who clearly demon-
strate the symptoms of a given disease. σ = 0 represents
the scenario, where all infected individuals are asymp-
tomatic. On the other hand, σ = 1 signifies that all
infected individuals clearly exhibit symptoms of a given
disease. Generally, 0 < σ < 1. The precise value of σ for
a given disease can be obtained from empirical data.
The dependence of the outcome of games played on
heterogeneous structures depends non-trivially on the
underlying topology [7, 15]. In our simulations, a het-
erogeneous population structure has been considered in
the form of a Baraba´si-Albert (BA) network, which is
known to emulate many real-world scenarios [16].
II. MODEL
Our model is quite general and addresses both symp-
tomatic (class M) and asymptomatic (class A) diseases.
Contagious diseases can spread through several different
mechanisms. These could range from being in the mere
proximity of an infected individual or coming in contact
with contaminated items used or even touched by the
individual. It could also spread through the bodily se-
cretions of an infected person, through sexual or other
physical contact or through various vectors.
Proactive individuals will choose precautionary mea-
sures of their own accord. Examples of such precau-
tionary measures are the maintenance of social distance,
wearing masks, and frequently washing hands. These
measures would surely lower the rate of the infection
spreading. However, adopting these measures comes at
the cost of a varying degree of restriction in one’s every-
day life. On the other hand, a careless individual will
not choose adequate protection against infection. Such
individuals are not merely a danger to many others but
even to themselves. Their non-cooperative and carefree
behaviour is likely to increase the rate of spread of infec-
tion.
Thus, we observe that broadly two strategies exist –
cooperation and defection [17]. Proactive individuals are
cooperators, C, who act towards preventing the spread
of infection by taking proper precaution. However, this
C D
C b− c −c
D b 0
TABLE I. The payoff matrix. Here, b = 1 and 0 < c < 1.
b > c ensures that Prisoner’s Dilemma is being played. We
have considered c = 0 for SD individuals, as they do not
undertake due precaution. Only measures like full vaccination
can lead to c = 1, thereby implying safety from the disease.
c < 1 is always associated with some risk.
comes at a cost, c. If an individual’s neighbor happens to
be a cooperator, it automatically obtains a benefit, b. On
the other hand, careless individuals can be considered as
defectors, D. They will not spend any cost and therefore,
for such defectors, c = 0. In spite of their callous be-
haviour – these defectors still enjoy benefit, b, due to the
accommodating behaviour of cooperators in the popula-
tion. Since this benefit comes at no cost, these defectors
effectively act like free-riders in a population. When two
cooperators, C, interact – they will be mutually benefited
by each other’s proactive actions. However, this benefit
has been arrived at by expending a cost, c. Therefore,
the actual reward enjoyed by these cooperators is (b− c).
The interaction between two defectors, D, will not lead
to any benefit or cost, for either of them. Thus, this
will result in zero payoffs. For the interaction between
a cooperator and a defector; D will obtain temptation
amounting to b, while C will derive the sucker’s payoff
equaling −c. True to their nature, defectors would try to
avoid paying any cost. Table I displays the payoff matrix
incorporating all the above interactions modeled on the
Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Asymptomatic individuals in class A diseases are
rather dangerous because they do not display clear symp-
toms of infection and yet unwittingly act as spreaders or
even super-spreaders. Perhaps the only way to identify
such infected individuals is through mass testing. Mass
testing, τ , allows the identification of both symptomatic
and asymptomatic infected individuals – even the mild
ones. The infected individuals who have been detected by
mass testing, are kept in quarantine and denoted by IQ.
Individuals in IQ do not take part in the game anymore.
For simplicity and without the loss of generalisation, we
presume here that they can not harm members of the sus-
ceptible population anymore. They can either recover,
which depends on recovery rate, ρ, or die depending on
the death rate, δ. On the other hand, individuals who
are infected and yet remain undetected, IU , cause fur-
ther infection in the population. IU can be of two types,
IC and ID. Without medical intervention, IU individu-
als can also recover at a “self-recovery rate”, ρs. Recall
that such self-recovery has been frequently observed dur-
ing COVID-19. All the states and the possible strategies
associated with each state is listed in Table II.
We consider that the rate of infection spread will de-
pend on the strategies of individuals. In a population, S
and IU individuals are likely to interact with each other
3State Strategic choice
Susceptible (S) Susceptible but proactive (SC)
Susceptible but careless(SD)
Infected (IU ) Infected but proactive (IC)
(undetected, asymptomatic) Infected but careless (ID)
Infected (IQ) No active strategic choice
(detected, symptomatic)
Recovered (R) No active strategic choice
Deceased (D) No active strategic choice
TABLE II. Strategies associated with various states.
causing the spread of infection. Both S and IU individ-
uals can adopt either cooperation or defection as their
strategy. SC and IC denote susceptible cooperators and
infected cooperators respectively. SC and IC are both
proactive and resort to appropriate precaution while in-
teracting with others. On the other hand, SD and ID de-
note susceptible defectors and infected defectors respec-
tively. Cost, c, reflects the extent of precaution under-
taken by an individual while the benefit obtained from
another proactive individual’s precautionary actions is
reflected in b, as aforementioned. c/b indicates the ex-
tent of precaution undertaken by an individual, where
obviously b > c. We can also define risk as r = (1 − cb ).C will resort to precaution at some cost to lower the risk.
However, c = 0 for D, implying r = 1, i.e., high risk.
Let ri and rj denote the risk related to two interacting
individuals i and j. If one of these individuals is infected
and other one is susceptible, the probability of the sus-
ceptible individual getting infected due to the interaction
is µ = (ri × rj). This indicates that µ of SC due to in-
teraction with IC is µC,C = (1 − cb )(1 − cb ) = (1 − cb )2.
Expectedly this is low because both of them have re-
sorted to adequate precaution. However, the probabil-
ity that an SD individual gets infected due to an in-
teraction with an ID individual is µD,D = 1. Again,
this is expectedly high because none of the individuals
have resorted to undertake proper precaution. Similarly,
µC,D = µD,C = (1 − cb ). Let us recall that individu-
als in the susceptible and infected state can employ ei-
ther of the two strategies – cooperation or defection. At
any time instant, if SC and IC denote the susceptible
and infected cooperators, then SC + IC = C. Similarly,
if SD and ID denote the susceptible and infected defec-
tors, then SD + ID = D. Lastly, if IC and ID denote
undetected individuals, then IC + ID = IU . Obviously,
S = SC + SD and I = IU + IQ.
We have already discussed in detail about the impor-
tance of Symptom Manifestation Rate, σ, in Section I.
For classM diseases, we have considered σ = 0.9, which
is rather high. On the other hand, σ = 0.02, has been
considered for class A diseases.
III. ALGORITHM
In our simulations, a heterogeneous population struc-
ture has been considered in the form of a Baraba´si-Albert
(BA) network, with an average degree 〈k〉. It is well-
known that BA networks possess a power-law degree dis-
tribution [16]. Each time step during both transient time
and counting time sequentially incorporates the events of:
(a) payoff determination, (b) strategy upgradation, and
(c) state upgradation. Initially every individual in the
population is susceptible. At the start of an epidemic
session, some of these individuals get infected randomly.
Thus, we have two states now – susceptible and infected.
The population has been equally divided into coopera-
tors, C, and defectors, D. Initially all infected individu-
als remain undetected i.e., IU = 0. Thus, on the basis
of both strategy and state, there exist four types of indi-
viduals, namely, SC , SD, IC , and ID. Initially, prisoner’s
dilemma is played between C and D, irrespective of the
state they belong to. They will accumulate their payoffs
by interacting with each other. It is rather superfluous to
consider any strategy for recovered and dead individuals
and they do not take part in the game. After determina-
tion of payoffs, all cooperators and defectors randomly
select a neighbor for strategy upgradation. Following
Fermi’s rule of strategy upgradation – an individual, i,
will adopt the strategy of a randomly chosen neighbor, j,
with a probability 11+exp[−(Πj−Πi)] . Πj and Πi denote the
total payoffs accumulated by j and i respectively. Strong
selection has been considered here.
After strategy upgradation, state upgradation takes
place. In the previous step, S and IU individuals decide
to be either C or D. In this step, infection would spread in
the population. It has been considered that infection can
spread through contact. Thus, susceptible neighbors of
any infected individual are vulnerable. Depending on the
strategy of both the interacting individuals i.e., C or D,
the probability of spreading of infection will be different.
While upgrading its state, S randomly interacts with
one of its neighbors. If that randomly chosen neighbor is
IU , S may get infected with a probability, µ. The newly
infected individuals may or may not manifest the symp-
toms. This would depend on the symptom manifestation
rate of the infection, σ. The symptomatic individuals
would be quarantined and they would not interact with
the rest of the population anymore. These individuals are
identified as IQ. The asymptomatic individuals remain
in population and could cause further infection.
All individuals would hence undergo mass testing with
probability, τ . Depending on τ , some infected individu-
als can also be identified as IQ. The remaining IU would
remain in the population. Since they are unaware of their
own situation they would unwittingly infect others. They
may undergo self-recovery depending on ρs or die with-
out getting any medical help, depending on the value of
δ. On the other hand, IQ individuals may either recover,
depending on the value of ρ, or die, depending on the
value of δ. Here for simplicity, the value of δ of IQ and
4IU has been considered to be the same. In our simula-
tions, reinfection of recovered individuals has not been
considered.
In all simulations, a transient time of 104 generations
is considered. After this transient time, fC = SC/N , is
calculated over a counting time of 103 generations. Every
network has N nodes and the average degree is denoted
by 〈k〉. The overall simulations have been performed over
EN networks. A definite fraction of nodes is initially as-
signed – at random – to act as cooperators. If fCi denotes
the initial fraction of cooperators in the population, then
fDi = (1 − fCi) denotes the initial fraction of defectors.
Apart from strategies, a definite number of nodes, i.e. in-
dividuals, are also randomly chosen to get infected. The
number of individuals who are initially infected, Ii, is
identical to the initial number of untested individuals,
IU – since they are not detected until tested. Obviously,
Si = (1 − Ii) denotes the initial fraction of susceptible
individuals in the population.
IV. RESULTS
FIG. 1. fC = SC/N versus cost, c. At the start of the sim-
ulations, the fraction of cooperators, fCi = 0.5, while the
fraction of the population which had been infected, Ii = 0.
Results are for a network of N = 1024 nodes, 〈k〉 = 4, 6, 8 and
EN = 500 networks. Evidently, cooperation is maintained at
lower values of c, and decreases with increasing c. Cooper-
ation seems to be maintained relatively better for lower 〈k〉.
The standard error is smaller than the size of the data points.
Prisoner’s Dilemma game has been played initially in
the absence of any infection, i.e., between SC and SD
only, which implies Ii = 0 and Si = 1. In that case,
fC = SC/N , depends only on c. SC dominates at lower
values of c but decreases at higher values of c, as shown in
Fig 1. This implies that if c increases, individuals would
be quite unwilling to adopt precautionary measures and
would try to defect.
A. Asymptomatic infections: class A
First, we have considered class A, where the symptom
manifestation ratio, σ, is very low. There are various dis-
eases where manifestation of symptoms can not often be
observed clearly, such as infections associated with Cy-
tomegalovirus, Rhinoviruses, Salmonella or Ebola [18–
20] infections. Here, we have considered that initially
2% individuals have been infected. Fig. 2 is for asymp-
tomatic case. It can be observed that fC decreases with
the increase of c. Hence, it can be concluded that in-
dividuals in the population will only cooperate for low
value of c. But due to the presence of infection, low c
implies higher risk. COVID19 infection can also be con-
sidered as asymptomatic infection due to a high number
of asymptomatic carriers [21].
FIG. 2. fC versus c for a predominantly asymptomatic disease
(σ = 0.02). Results are for fCi = 0.5, Ii = 0.02, ρ = 0.5,
ρs = 0.2, τ = 0.3, δ = 0.05, N = 1024 nodes, 〈k〉 = 4, 6, 8
and EN = 580 networks. Cooperation is witnessed to some
extent for a limited range of c. In asymptomatic (class A)
diseases, lower c indicates a higher risk of getting infected.
On the other hand, a higher cost is naturally unaffordable to
most individuals. The standard error is smaller than the size
of the data points.
Hence, alongside defectors, these cooperators are also
likely to get infected at lower values of c. However, if we
increase c, better protection ensures higher fC . For a BA
network with 〈k〉 = 4, we observe that fC is higher when
c = [0.25, 0.35]. Though, a higher cost implies lower
risk, it also inhibits the lifestyle of SC individuals. Nat-
urally, cooperation would be hindered at higher values
of c. Hence, with increasing costs, SC individuals tend
to becomes careless, implying that SD individuals would
be likely to dominate. Also SD individuals would get
infected at a higher rate due to the absence of proper
precaution on their part. In the case of high 〈k〉 graphs,
as shown in Fig. 2, it has been observed the peak shifts
towards the lower value of c. Generally, the maintenance
of cooperation is lower when 〈k〉 of the graph is high.
5FIG. 3. fC versus c for a predominantly symptomatic disease
(σ = 0.9). Results are for fCi = 0.5, ρ = 0.5, ρs = 0.2, τ =
0.3, δ = 0.05, N = 1024 nodes, 〈k〉 = 4, 6, 8 and EN = 500.
Increasing costs lead to decreasing cooperation. The standard
error is smaller than the size of the data points.
B. Symptomatic infections: class M
ClassM diseases obviously have a high symptom man-
ifestation ratio associated with them. Infections like Vib-
rio cholerae and Poxviruses are examples of such symp-
tomatic diseases. This scenario has been examined in
Fig. 3. Here too, fC is observed to decrease with an
increase of c at different values of 〈k〉.
FIG. 4. fC versus τ at various values of c as quantified for:
(a) σ = 0.02 (class A), and, (b) σ = 0.9 (class M). Red rep-
resents maintenance of cooperation and blue its absence. For
classA diseases, cooperation depends on both τ and c. Higher
value of τ can lead to more cooperation. Cooperation will not
be maintained well enough at lower values of τ . However, for
class M diseases, maintenance of cooperation depends more
on c rather than τ . This indicates that mass testing plays an
important role for the survival of cooperators in the case of
class A diseases. Results are for δ = 0.05, ρ = 0.5, ρs = 0.2,
N = 1024, 〈k〉 = 4, and EN = 100.
C. Comparing symptomatic and asymptomatic
infections
From Fig. 4, it is evident that both mass testing and
cost due to precautionary measures have a significant im-
pact on fC . At higher values of c, cooperation will not
be maintained in the population. But for lower values of
c, the maintenance of cooperation would depend on the
value of τ . In class A diseases, it is difficult to maintain
cooperation at lower values of τ . This can be intuitively
inferred from the fact that it is rather difficult to iden-
tify infected individuals without mass testing. Therefore,
higher values of τ can lead to relatively higher coopera-
tion. On the other hand, τ does not really have a signif-
icant impact in class M diseases.
Therefore, it is worth noting that when the mass test-
ing ratio, τ , is low, an asymptomatic disease is likely to
infect susceptible individuals more. Naturally, if the in-
fected individuals are not identified then asymptomatic
diseases have the potential to turn into pandemics. On
the other hand, a symptomatic disease will not be able to
spread significantly, even when τ is low. This is because
IU in class M diseases, can be identified more easily via
symptoms. Hence, the chances for symptomatic diseases
to turn into a pandemic are lower.
FIG. 5. fC versus Ii as quantified for: (a) σ = 0.02 (class A),
and, (b) σ = 0.9 (classM). Results are for c = 0.3, fCi = 0.5,
ρ = 0.5, ρs = 0.2, τ = 0.3, δ = 0.05, N = 1024, 〈k〉 = 4, 6,
8 and EN = 500. At lower population densities, the fraction
of proactive individuals actually decreases with the increase
of Ii. However, at a higher 〈k〉, cooperation increases slightly
with the increase in Ii. The standard error is smaller than
the size of the data points.
The initial fraction of infected individuals, Ii, reflects
the scenario during the initial outbreak of an epidemic.
We explore the behaviour of fC with respect to Ii [22].
A fraction of the population, Ii, is infected right at the
onset of the epidemic, before consciousness has taken root
6in the general population. Consciousness is expected to
increase subsequently and the general populace would
become aware and responsible. Fig. 5 implies that the
final fraction of proactive individuals would decrease in
the population at lower 〈k〉. However, at higher 〈k〉, the
final fraction of responsible people would increase slightly
in the population. In this case, the broad behaviour is
notably the same for both classM and classA epidemics.
V. DISCUSSION
Accurate models of epidemic spreading are essential
[23–25], as has been clearly underscored during the on-
going COVID-19 pandemic. Prevalence of asymptomatic
carriers complicates the detection and management of
any disease to a significant extent [26–28]. Models
based on SIRD dynamics or game-theoretic approaches
on networks may not be able to capture the complete
picture as they usually do not consider this important
aspect [7, 29]. Our model explores the possible effect
of various factors in epidemic spreading. Absence of
vaccines makes individual and social proactiveness as
extremely important factors, which can inhibit disease
spreading. Also, the fraction of the population which
has undergone testing is an essential factor in diseases
involving asymptomatic phenotypes. In absence of high
enough testing – an asymptomatic disease bears the po-
tential to become a pandemic. We also observe that the
fraction of proactive individuals varies with the initial
fraction of infected individuals and the average degree
of the network considerably influences this behaviour.
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